

# **Position Paper: The Detrimental Impact of a 15% Overhead Rate Cap on DOE SBIR Grants**

## **Executive Summary**

The Department of Energy's policy implementing a flat 15% overhead rate cap for SBIR grants represents a significant threat to the program's core mission of fostering innovation among small businesses. This paper demonstrates that the policy creates insurmountable financial barriers for non-venture-backed companies, effectively restricting program participation to well-capitalized firms. With small businesses forced to absorb losses of approximately 35% when typical overhead rates average 50%, the policy undermines the program's integrity, reduces innovation diversity, and weakens America's energy technology development ecosystem. Edward G. Jameson, CPA, whose firm specializes in government contract and grant accounting for approximately 200 small startups, warns this policy shift threatens to reduce participation in basic scientific research and creates substantial new risks for fraud due to eliminated audit requirements.

## **Background**

The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program was established to engage America's small businesses in federal research and development with potential for commercialization. The program aims to stimulate technological innovation, meet federal research needs, and increase private-sector commercialization of innovations. Small businesses in the R&D sector typically operate with an average overhead rate of approximately 50%, reflecting their genuine costs of operation in research-intensive environments. These indirect costs represent essential business functions including contract administration, payroll processing, security personnel, information technology systems, shared research equipment, researcher benefits such as health care and insurance, office space and supplies, and facility rent.

In 1982, under President Ronald Reagan, the SBIR program was introduced and has since been considered one of the most successful government funding programs. It is currently set to sunset on September 20, 2025. The 15% cap announced by the Department of Energy on May 8, 2025, which purportedly "saves the US taxpayer \$935,000,000," represents a dramatic departure from established practice and recognized business needs.

## **Financial Impact Analysis**

Understanding what indirect costs represent is crucial to grasping the policy's impact. These costs cover essential business functions that enable research: contract administrators who manage federal compliance requirements, payroll systems that ensure

researchers are paid, security personnel who protect sensitive research, IT infrastructure that supports data analysis, shared laboratory equipment used across projects, researcher benefits including health care and insurance, office facilities where the work occurs, and basic supplies needed for daily operations.

Our analysis demonstrates the severe financial consequences for small businesses:

1. **Substantial Unrecoverable Costs:** A small business with the standard 50% overhead would absorb losses of approximately 35% of the total grant value.
2. **Limited Fee Offset:** Even with the maximum allowed 7% fee, companies still face a net loss of 28% of grant value.
3. **Scale of Impact:** For a typical \$1.5 million Phase II grant, a small business would need to subsidize roughly \$420,000 from other sources after maximizing fee usage.
4. **Profit Margin Context:** The unrecoverable costs (28-35%) dramatically exceed typical small business profit margins (7-10%), making participation economically unsustainable without substantial external subsidy.

## **Strategic Consequences**

### **1. Restricts Program Participation**

The policy effectively creates a "pay-to-play" model where only companies with substantial external funding can afford to participate. This contradicts the program's foundational purpose of expanding the innovation base beyond well-capitalized firms.

### **2. Advantages Venture-Backed Companies**

Jameson observes that venture capital-backed companies would likely accept grant funding even with a zero percent indirect cost rate because their intellectual property has often been developed beyond basic scientific research. This policy shift effectively means that rather than subsidizing basic scientific advancement, federal funds will increasingly go to established ideas that already have funding.

### **3. Reduces Innovation Diversity**

By limiting participation to specific business models and financial structures, the policy reduces the diversity of technical approaches. This homogenization of the innovation pipeline undermines the core SBIR objective of promoting varied solutions to technological challenges.

### **4. Creates Significant Fraud and Abuse Risks**

The shift to a de minimis indirect rate (the 15% cap is effectively the de minimis rate not subject to audit) creates substantial new integrity risks. Jameson notes that while de minimis indirect rates have always been available, almost none of his clients could afford to take them. The elimination of auditing requirements for these rates creates a dangerous oversight gap that could lead to cost misclassification and potential misappropriation of federal funds.

## **5. Disadvantages Critical Technology Areas**

Research requiring significant infrastructure, specialized facilities, or advanced equipment becomes particularly uneconomical. This disproportionately impacts energy innovation areas that often require substantial physical resources and specialized expertise.

### **Historical Context of Innovation Support**

The 15% cap policy represents a significant departure from the supportive framework established by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which successfully encouraged the transfer of scientific discoveries from universities to for-profit companies with federal seed funding when merited. This legislative foundation helped create a robust innovation ecosystem that has driven scientific advancement for 45 years.

### **Calculation Methodology**

To illustrate the impact, here's a breakdown for a typical \$250,000 Phase I grant:

#### **Scenario 1: Realistic Small Business Overhead (50%)**

- Direct costs: \$166,667 (calculated as  $\$250,000 \div 1.50$ )
- Indirect costs: \$83,333 (50% of direct costs)
- Total: \$250,000

#### **Scenario 2: DOE 15% Overhead Rate**

- Direct costs: \$217,391 (calculated as  $\$250,000 \div 1.15$ )
- Indirect costs allowed: \$32,609 (15% of direct costs)
- Total: \$250,000

#### **Scenario 3: Actual Overhead Needs (50%)**

- Direct costs: \$217,391 (same as Scenario 2)
- Actual indirect costs incurred: \$108,696 (50% of direct costs)

- Reimbursed indirect costs: \$32,609 (15% of direct costs)
- Unreimbursed costs: \$76,087

### **Financial Loss Summary**

- Loss as percentage of total grant: 30.4% ( $\$76,087 \div \$250,000$ )
- Net loss after maximum fee (7%): 23.4% of grant value
- For Phase II (\$1.5M): Unreimbursed costs of approximately \$456,522, or \$350,000 after fee

### **Broader Economic Implications**

The policy undermines several key national priorities:

1. **Small Business Growth:** Rather than supporting small business development, the policy creates unsustainable financial burdens on emerging companies.
2. **Technology Leadership:** By narrowing the participant pool, the policy limits the exploration of diverse technological approaches needed to maintain American leadership.
3. **Innovation Ecosystem Development:** The policy weakens regional innovation ecosystems by disadvantaging small businesses unable to access substantial investment capital.
4. **National Scientific Standing:** As Jameson cautions, we risk becoming "a second-class nation to those who put a higher priority on basic scientific research" if we continue to undermine the financial viability of early-stage innovation.

### **Recommendations**

1. **Restore Realistic Overhead Rates:** Return to evidence-based overhead policies that reflect the genuine costs of business operations (approximately 50% for small research businesses).
2. **Maintain Proper Audit Protocols:** Preserve the audit requirements for indirect cost rates to ensure program integrity and prevent potential fraud.
3. **Focus on Output Accountability:** Rather than restricting input costs, strengthen accountability for project outcomes and commercialization results.

4. **Preserve SBIR's Core Mission:** Ensure that as the SBIR program approaches its September 2025 sunset date, it maintains its original purpose as a platform for basic scientific research with reasonable, audited indirect cost rates.

## **Conclusion**

The 15% overhead rate cap fundamentally undermines the SBIR program's core mission by creating insurmountable financial barriers for most small businesses. Rather than enhancing program effectiveness, it restricts participation to a narrow subset of companies with substantial external funding, reducing innovation diversity and weakening America's technology development ecosystem.

The elimination of audit requirements for the de minimis rate further compounds these concerns by creating significant financial oversight gaps that could damage the program's reputation and sustainability.

A return to evidence-based overhead policies that reflect genuine business costs and maintain proper audit protocols is essential to preserve the SBIR program's role in fostering diverse, innovative approaches to energy challenges. As we approach the SBIR program's sunset date in 2025, maintaining its focus on promoting basic scientific research from a diverse range of businesses is critical to America's continued leadership in innovation.